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In 2010, following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank Act"). 2 Among other provisions, the Dodd-Frank
Act established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
("CFPB" or "Bureau") as a direct response to the risky and harmful
actions by the financial industry that precipitated the greatest
recession the country had seen in nearly seventy years. In fact, it
was precisely because of these actions-actions that led to trillions
of dollars of lost wealth for American families-that Congress was
able to restructure much of the financial regulatory structure that
had existed for decades.' With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act,
1 Seth Frotman is Executive Director of the Student Borrower Protection
Center. Until August 2018, he served as Assistant Director and Student Loan
Ombudsman of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The author would
like to thank Martha Fulford, Bonnie Latreille, and Mike Pierce for their
assistance in reviewing this article.
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376.
See, e.g., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ET
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Congress, for the first time, created an independent federal agency
with broad new tools and a singular vision: to oversee America's
financial markets for violations of consumer financial protection
laws.
The Bureau's mission reflected the systemic failures in the
consumer finance marketplace that precipitated its creation: the
toxic mortgages and widespread consumer harm that ultimately
brought on the Great Recession. The CFPB's mission was twofold: (1) correct the mistakes that wreaked havoc on the mortgage
market during the 2008 financial crisis, and (2) ensure that nothing
like the 2008 financial crisis ever happened again.4 And in its early
years, the Bureau diligently pursued this mission. In its first two
years, the Bureau issued or updated twenty-three different
regulations, including expansive new rules affecting the
origination and servicing of residential mortgages.' The impact of
these new rules was significant. For example, the Bureau estimates
that without its amendments to the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA"), "at least 26,000 additional borrowers
would have experienced foreclosure within three years, and at least
127,000 fewer borrowers would have recovered from delinquency
within three years. "6
However, the Bureau's mandate extends beyond
mortgages-it includes payday loans, credit cards, auto loans,
and-the focus of this paper-student loans. In fact, experts have
likened the widespread distress in the student loan market to the
recession-era mortgage market, noting the striking similarities
AL., JOINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 301-326 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL
(April 2011),
PROTECTION ACT
CONSUMER
STREET REFORM AND

https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/otherpublications-reports/pub-joint-implement-plan-dodd-frank-sec-301-326.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Deputy
Secretary Neal Wolin Written Testimony before the Senate Banking Committee
on "Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act" (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg881.aspx ("The Act builds a stronger financial system by
addressing major gaps and weaknesses in regulation that helped cause the
financial crisis that led to the recession. It puts in place buffers and safeguards
to reduce the chance that another generation will have to go through a crisis of
similar magnitude.").
2013),
(Nov.
REPORT
I CFPB, FALL 2013 SEMI-ANNUAL
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20131 1cfpb-semi-annual-report.pdf ("In its
first two years, the Bureau has issued or updated several rules under the DoddFrank Act, including 23 as of September 30, 2013.").
6

CFPB, 2013 RESPA SERVICING RULE ASSESSMENT REPORT (2019).
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between the two, particularly in the years following the financial
crisis.
This article reviews the extent to which the Bureau's
authorities and subsequent efforts cover the second largest class of
consumer debt in this nation-student loan debt. In particular, it
focuses on the critical role that student loan servicers play, both as
the vehicle through which tens of millions of borrowers participate
in this market and the extent to which widespread illegal servicing
practices fuel consumer harm and financial distress.
This Article begins with an overview of the student loan
market, with a particular focus on the role of non-depository
financial companies ("nonbanks"). In Part II, this article will
review the role that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
has played in the student loan market and the extent to which the
Bureau employed its broad authorities with respect to the student
loan servicing industry. It also discusses how the Bureau's
oversight, enforcement, and policy initiatives exposed the need for
a student loan servicing rule. In Part III, it explores the features of
the student loan servicing market that suggest setting strong,
baseline standards through rulemaking is necessary to improve
practices by the student loan servicing industry and mitigate
consumer harm. In Part IV, it defines the authority under the
which the Bureau can write a student loan servicing rule. In Part
V, it envisions the scope of a student loan servicing rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, 44.7 million consumers collectively owe $1.598
trillion in student loan debt-exceeding the total volume of credit

Rohit Chopra, Assistant Director & Student Loan Ombudsman, CFPB,
Prepared Remarks Before the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Nov. 18,
2013), transcript available at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/student-loan-ombudsman-rohit-chopra-before-the-federalreserve-bank-of-st-louis/ ("The student loan-housing connection is actually
much deeper than the first-time . homebuyer problem.... Given these
similarities, it should not be surprising to find common problems when loans
became due.... For struggling homeowners and student loan borrowers, the
consequences of being unable to find an affordable repayment option are severe.
The impacts of foreclosures may not just be felt by the former homeowner, but
potentially by the entire neighborhood. For student loan borrowers who default
early in their lives, the negative impact on their credit report can make it more
difficult to pass employment verification checks or ever reach their dream of
buying a home.").
7
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card debt and vehicle debt, falling behind only mortgages. Student
loan debt now makes up 11 percent of all household debt, up from
four percent in 2007.9
The speed and scale of the growth of student debt is
unprecedented in the half-century long history of the modern
student loan market-between 2007 and 2019 the number of
student loan borrowers in America climbed by nearly 15 million
people as the volume of outstanding student debt nearly tripled.10
The distribution of this burden is not limited to young
consumers-in fact, the fastest growing segment of consumers
with student debt is people over the age of 60. As of 2017, there
were nearly 3.5 million student loan borrowers over the age of 60,
an increase of 46 percent from five years prior."
Beyond age, research demonstrates how student debt is
impacting vulnerable borrowers, including populations of
borrowers for which the Bureau has a Congressional mandate to
help protect. 12 For example, the Bureau's Office of Servicemember
Affairs repeatedly highlighted the disproportionate burden student
loan debt places on military families, and how servicing failures
can jeopardize military readiness.1 3 Student loan debt also
8

U.S.

FED. RESERVE BANK,

(May

G. 19, Consumer Credit Statistical Release

7,

2019),

Household
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/current/default.htm;
(2018),
OF
N.Y.
BANK
FED.
RESERVE
Data,
Credit
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/xl
s/slupdate_2018.xlsx.
9 QuarterlyReport on Household Debt and Credit, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF
N.Y.
(Feb.
2019),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/xl
s/hhd_c_report_2018q4.xlsx.
10 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, FEDERAL
STUDENT

LOAN

PORTFOLIO:

PORTFOLIO

SUMMARY,

https:/studentaid.ed.gov/sasites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/Portfoli
oSummary.xls (last visited June 6, 2019).
" CFPB, OLDER CONSUMER AND STUDENT LOAN DEBT BY STATE (2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201708_cfpb-older-consumersand-student-loan-debt-by-state.pdf.
12 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 5493(e), (g).

& HOLLISTER

PETRAEUS, CFPB, OVERSEAS

&

13 See, e.g., SETH FROTMAN

UNDERSERVED: STUDENT LOAN SERVICING AND THE COST TO OUR MEN AND
WOMEN IN UNIFORM (2015); see also Hollister K. Petraeus, Assistant Director,

&

CFPB, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
Transportation (Nov. 20, 2013), transcript available at
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/hollister-k-petraeusbefore-the-u-s-senate-committee-on-commerce-science-transportation/
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disproportionately impacts women, communities of color, and
rural communities.1 4 Congress tasked the Bureau with protecting
all borrowers, including each of these populations, from predatory
financial practices. 15
The Student Loan Market
When examining how and why a student loan servicing
rulemaking should be a priority for the Bureau, it is important to
understand the unique transition that took place in the student
loan market contemporaneous to the consideration and passage of
the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.
Prior to 2010, the student loan market was largely
comprised of loans made under the Federal Family Education
Loan Program ("FFELP"). Under FFELP, companies originated
loans that were subsidized and guaranteed by the federal
government, at interest rates set by Congress. In 2010, as part of
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act ("HCERA"),
the FFEL program was ended, and federal student loans were
made exclusively through the Direct Loan Program."
The change from lending under the FFEL Program to the
Direct Loan Program was part of a significant shift across the
student loan market. Shortly before Congress elected to end new
originations of FFELP loans, it authorized the Department of
Education ("ED") to purchase more than $150 billion in
outstanding FFELP loans, while leaving another $350 billion in
"commercial" FFELP loans held by private creditors." This made

(quoting Adm. Mike Mullen, who stated "A sailor's financial readiness directly
impacts unit readiness and the Navy's ability to accomplish its mission.. . .").
14
Women's Student Debt Crisis in the United States, AM. Ass'N OF
(last
UNIVERSITY WOMEN, https://www.aauw.org/research/deeper-in-debt/
updated May 2019); Report: Defaulted Federal Student Loan Borrowers in
Communities of Color Are DisproportionatelySued, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CENTER (2019), https://www.nclc.org/media-center/report-defaulted-federalstudent-loan-borrowers-in-communities-of-color-are-disproportionatelysued.html; PJ Tabit & Josh Winters, "RuralBrainDrain" ExaminingMillennial
Migration Patterns and Student Loan Debt, 1 CONSUMER & COMMUNITY
7,
at
2019,
1,
Jan.
no.
CONTEXT,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/consumer-communitycontext-201901.pdf.
" See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 5493(b)(2), (c).
1
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, P.L. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029.
17 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION,
ENSURING CONTINUED ACCESS TO
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ED the largest student loan holder in the country and, as the thenhead of its lending arm explained in 2017, "the... largest specialpurpose consumer bank in the world.""8 The student loan portfolio
held by the U.S. Department of Education ballooned to more than
$1.2 trillion by 2019.19
This is not to dismiss the significance of private student
loans in the market. In the years surrounding the financial crisis,
private student lending reached its peak as a share of all
outstanding student debt-in 2009, private student loans
comprised approximately 17 percent of the student loan market,
the majority of which were originated by banks. 2 0 The share of the
student loan market comprised of private student loans has since
declined; however, the private student loan market remains
significant in size-outstanding private student loans collectively
total $119 billion.2 1
Today, federal loans comprise approximately 92 percent of
outstanding student loans, with private loans remaining an
enduring feature of the higher education finance landscape, but
(ECASLA) ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (July 2011),
https://studentaid.ed.gov/salsites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/July201
1ECASLAReport.pdf.
1 U.S. Dep't of Education, Press Release: Secretary DeVos Announces
Intent to Enhance FSA's Next Generation Processing and Servicing
Environment (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretarydevos-announces-intent-enhance-fsas-next-generation-processing-andservicing-environment, ("The FSA Student Loan Program represents the
equivalent of being the largest special purpose consumer bank in the world").
19 See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN
STUDENT LOANS ACT

PORTFOLIO:

PORTFOLIO

SUMMARY,

https://studentaid.ed.gov/sasites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/Portfoli
oSummary.xls (last visited May 28, 2019).
20 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS: REPORT
TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER
PROTECTION
ACT
§
1027
(Aug.
29,

2012), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20120cfpbReports-PrivateStudent-Loans.pdf;
OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN PORTFOLIO:
PORTFOLIO
SUMMARY, https://studentaid.ed.gov/salsites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/libr

ary/PortfolioSummary.xls (last visited May 28, 2019); see also, Rohit Chopra,
Too Big to Fail: Student debt hits a trillion, CFPB BLOG (Mar. 21, 2012),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/too-big-to-fail-student-debthits-a-trillion/
21 MEASUREONE, https://www.measureone.com/home (last visited May 28,
2019).
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increasingly becoming a product used in conjunction with federal
student loans.22
The Student Loan ServicingMarket
The prevalence of federal student loans makes ED the
dominant player in the market. ED contracts with private
companies to manage the servicing of ED-held FFELP loans and
Direct Loans.2 3 Currently, the Department of Education has
contracts with nine companies, two of which are subsidiaries of the
same corporate parent. 24 The majority of the portfolio of
outstanding federally owned student debt is allocated to four
servicers operated by just three companies: Nelnet, Navient, and
the Pennsylvania Higher
Education
Assistance Agency
IV Additional
Title
to
as
referred
("PHEAA")-collectively
Servicers ("TIVAS").25 Navient and Nelnet are private, publicly
traded financial services companies, while PHEAA is an entity
chartered by the state of Pennsylvania. 26 The legacy "commercial"

22

See supra note 19; see also, PrivateLoans Factsand Trends, INSTITUTE

FOR

COLLEGE

ACCESS

&

SUCCESs

(Apr.

2019)

https://ticas.org/sites/default/files/pub-files/pl-facts-trends.pdf;see also, 17^
Annual Report: Student Debt and the Class of 201 7, INSTITUTE FOR COLLEGE
ACCESs

&

SUCCESS

12

(Sept.

2018),

https:/ticas.org/sites/default/files/pub-files/classof2017.pdf (noting that 70
percent of private student loan borrowers also have federal student loans).
23 Loan Servicing Contracts, OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, (last accessed
May
28,. 2019)
https://studentaid.ed.gov/salabout/data-center/businessinfo/contracts/loan-servicing.
24 Id. While there are four designated TIVAS-Navient, Nelnet, PHEAA,
and Great Lakes-in 2018, Nelnet acquired Great Lakes. Direct Loans awarded
to Great Lakes are still serviced under the Great Lakes-brand. See Press Release,
Nelnet Completes Acquisition of Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc.
(Feb.
7,
2018),
http://www.nelnetinvestors.com/news/press-releasedetails/2018/Nelnet-Completes-Acquisition-of-Great-Lakes-Educational-LoanServices-Inc/default.aspx. Not-for-profit entities service the remainder of ED's
federal loan portfolio.
25 See OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID, FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN
PORTFOLIO:

SERVICER

PORTFOLIO

BY

LOAN

STATUS,

https://studentaid.ed.gov/salsites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/Portfoli
obyLoanStatus.xls (last visited Dec. 2018).
26 See, e.g., NAVIENT, https://www.navient.com/ (last accessed May 28,
2019); NELNET, https://www.nelnet.com (last visited May 28, 2019); PHEAA,
https://www.pheaa.org/about/ (last visited May 28, 2019). PHEAA operates two
primary business units- American Education Services, which handles student
loans made by banks and other commercial clients, and FedLoan Servicing
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FFELP segment of the student loan market is largely serviced by
these same three companies.27
Many private student lenders manage privately held
student loan portfolios in a manner similar to the Department of
Education-contracting with third-party entities to service private
student loans.2 8 PNC Bank and Citizens Bank are among the
largest private student lenders in the market, and they contract
with PHEAA and Nelnet for servicing, respectively.2 9 In addition,
both Navient and Nelnet own or control their own substantial
portfolios of private student loans, some of which have been
securitized and all of which continue to be serviced in-house by
their own student loan servicing subsidiaries.3 0

which handles loans on behalf of the federal government. Collectively,
PHEAA's servicing units handle more than $1 out of every $10 in non-housing
consumer debt in America. See PA. HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY,
8,
2019),
June
(accessed
LEGISLATORS
FOR
HANDBOOK
2018

("Grand Total
https://www.pheaa.org/about/pdf/handbook-legislators.pdf
422.9B of assets managed on PHEAA's systems"); Quarterly Report on
Household Debt and Credit, FED.

RESERVE

BANK

OF N.Y.

(2019),

https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/hhdc.html (showing $4.02 trillion
in non-housing consumer debt outstanding as of Q1 2019.). Further, although
PHEAA continues to assert that it is an agency of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and thus entitled to sovereign immunity in defense of a wide range
of private lawsuits, federal courts have held that PHEAA is legally a private
company.); see, Natalie Kitroeff, CourtRules ThatStudentLoanCompanysn't
Above

the

Law,

NEWS

BLOOMBERG

(2015),

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-23/court-rules-thatstudent-loan-company-isn-t-above-the-law.
27 Top 100 CurrentHolders ofFFELPLoansfor 2017 and2016 (sequenced
from high to low on 9/30/17 $Outstanding), OFFICE OF FED. STUDENT AID:
(2017),

PORTAL

PARTNERS

FINANCIAL

(In
https://fp.ed.gov/attachments/publications/FY2 017Top lOOLenders.pdf
addition to being in the top 5 loan holders, these companies contract with many
other FFELP loan holders to service commercial FFELP loans.).
subsidiary,
28 For example, Citizens Bank contracts with Nelnet's
Firstmark. See Access My Student Loans, CITIZENS BANK (last visited May 28,
https://www.citizensbank.com/student-lending/access-my-student2019),
loan.aspx.
29 See, e.g., PNC Solution Loan, PNC (last visited May 28, 2019),
https://www.pnc.com/en/personal-banking/borrowing/education-loancenter/pnc-solution-undergraduate-loans.html; Access My Student Loans,
CITIZENS

BANK,

(last

visited

May

28,

2019),

https://www.citizensbank.com/student-lending/access-my-student-loan.aspx.
21, 2019),
(Jan.
10-K)
(Form
Report
Annual
'0 Navient,
https://navient.comlassets/about/investors/shareholder/annual-
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As noted above, the student loan servicing market remains
dominated by Navient, Nelnet, and PHEAA, which collectively
manage more than $1.2 trillion in private and federal student loan
debt." In effect, nearly four out of every five dollars of student debt
in America is managed by these three nonbank entities.3 2 Although
no comprehensive accounting exists documenting the distribution
of the remaining approximately $400 billion in outstanding student
debt serviced by other market participants, evidence suggests this
servicing volume is distributed across three very large banks and
another approximately three dozen nonbank student loan
companies, five of which currently perform student loan servicing
under contract with the U.S. Department of Education.

reports/NAVI_2018_Form_10-KFinal.pdf, (Commercial Servicing, $94.5
billion); Nelnet, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2018),
http://s2 1.q4cdn.com/36892076 1/files/docfinancials/annual/2018/12911_Annu
alReport 2019_Full_0408_rl.pdf (Commercial: $53.13 billion). Readers should
note one significant exception to this general observation. At least three banks
that issue private student loans, including, for example, Discover Bank and
Sallie Mae Bank, elect to service their own loans in house, also known as firstparty servicing. See Student Loans with Great Rates, DISCOVER,
https://www.discover.com/student-loans/

SALLIE

MAE,

https://www.salliemae.com/.
31 Based on the authors' analysis of publicly available data on servicing
volumes, 77 percent of all student loan servicing is conducted by three large
nonbank loan servicers that collectively service more than $1.195T in student
loans. Two of these servicers (Nelnet and PHEAA) also lease their servicing
technology to smaller firms that collectively service billions of dollars in
additional student debt. See NAVIENT, https://www.navient.com/ (last accessed
May 28, 2019); NELNET, https://www.nelnet.com (last visited May 28, 2019);
PHEAA, https://www.pheaa.org/about/ (last visited May 28, 2019).
32 Id.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, OMB CONTROL No. 3170, STUDENT
SUPPORTING STATEMENT (Feb. 23, 2017),

LOAN MARKET MONITORING

https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2017-0002-0002 ("This data
collection is limited to student loan servicers within the Bureau's supervisory
authority. Including selected insured depository institutions with total assets of
more than $10,000,000,000 that service their own student loans and larger
nonbank participants in the student loan servicing market, which have student
loan servicing account volumes exceeding one million. Our research has shown
us that there are ten student loan servicers that meet these criteria.");
Connecticut Department of Banking, Downloadable Student Loan Servicers
Licensee List as of June 1, 2019 (June 2019), https://portal.ct.gov//medialDOB/Consumer-Credit-Licenses/student loan servicers.xlsx?la=en,
(showing 39 unique nonbank companies had obtained a student loan servicing
license from the State of Connecticut); U.S. Department of Education, Servicer
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Irrespective of whether a loan is made by a bank, a nonbank
lender, or the United States government, all student loans are
serviced by entities that engage "in offering or providing a
consumer financial product or service," as defined by the DoddFrank Act. 3 4 Therefore, all of these entities fall under the purview
of the CFPB.

II. THE BUREAU'S EFFORTS IN THE STUDENT LOAN
MARKET
It is clear that the drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act were
concerned about consumer risk in the student loan market. 6 In
fact, Congress specifically mandated certain actions by the CFPB
with respect to student loans. For example, the Act calls for the
designation of a Student Loan Ombudsman.37 The Act also
mandated a report from the Director of the Bureau and the
Secretary of Education to Congress regarding the composition of
the private student loan market and recommendations for
improving consumer protections for student loan borrowers with
both private and federal student loans.3 8 Furthermore, the Act
establishes enhanced supervisory authority over nonbank private

10,
2019),
June
Portfolio -by Repayment Plan (last visited
(identifying
https://studentaid.ed.gov/salabout/data-center/student/portfolio
approximately $100b in total loan volume assigned to "not for profits" by the
Department of Education).
34 12 U.S.C. § 5481; see generally, 12 U.S.C. Subchapter V. For further
discussion of CFPB's authorities as they related to nonbank student loan
servicers, see CFPB, Letter from Director Richard Cordray to Education
2017),
(Sept.
DeVos
Betsy
Secretary
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2017/09/Cordray-DeVos-Letter.pdf.
3

Id.

See, e.g., The White House, Remarks by the President at Signing of
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentsigning-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act ("Now, for
all those Americans who are wondering what Wall Street reform means for you,
here's what you can expect. If you've ever applied for a credit card, a student
loan, or a mortgage, you know the feeling of signing your name to pages of barely
understandable fine print. What often happens as a result is that many
Americans are caught by hidden fees and penalties, or saddled with loans they
can't afford.").
3' 12 U.S.C. § 5535.
3 12 U.S.C. § 5602.
36
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student loan originators.3 9
However, the Bureau's authorities that apply to the student
loan market are far more expansive than these explicit references
would suggest, if only considered in isolation. Under the DoddFrank Act, the Bureau has broad authority with respect to markets
of "consumer financial products and services," a definition that is
inclusive of student loans, mortgages, payday loans, credit cards,
and more.4 0 Accordingly, in the student loan market, Congress
granted the Bureau authority to engage in regulation, research,
data collection, complaint handling, and enforcement.4 1
Furthermore, while the Bureau's authority to supervise all large
banks and certain nonbanks vested immediately, 42 Congress also
granted CFPB authority to supervise other nonbank "'larger
participant[s]' of markets for other consumer financial products or
services, as the Bureau defines by rule." 43 The Bureau chose to
exercise this "larger participant" authority in the student loan
servicing market, finalizing a rule to establish the first nonbank
student loan servicing examination program that went into effect
in 2014.44 Combined with the Bureau's statutory authority to
supervise large banks, this 2014 rulemaking ensured that the
Bureau's examination program would cover the entirety of the
student loan servicing market. 45
Complementing the structural features of the Bureau that
cover participants in the student loan servicing market, the Bureau
administers a range of consumer protection laws that govern the
conduct of these market participants. 4 6 For example, the Bureau's
"enumerated consumer laws" include the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), which prohibits discrimination in the
offering of credit, including when borrowers with federal student

3
40
41

12 U.S.C. § 5481(5).
12 U.S.C. § 5511(a).
12 U.S.C. §§ 5511(c)(2), 5514, 5515, 5564.

42

12 U.S.C.

43

12 C.F.R.
12 C.F.R.

44

§ 5515.
§ 1090 (2013).
§ 1090.106.

45 CONSUMER

FIN.

PROT. BUREAU, DEFINING LARGER PARTICIPANTS OF

THE STUDENT LOAN SERVICING MARKET at 13 (2013),

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb-student-servicing-rule.pdf
("As one industry commenter recognized, establishment of supervision over
larger nonbank participants in the student loan servicing market is also
appropriate because banks that engage in student loan servicing already are
subject to Federal supervision with respect to Federal consumer financial law.")
46 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12).
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7
loans are applying for income-driven repayment plans.4 The
Bureau's purview also includes administering the prohibition on
Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts and Practices ("UDAAP"),
which applies to a range of common servicing practices that are
discussed in the next section.4 8
Since 2011, the Bureau has deployed these various
authorities to stop abuses by student loan companies and drive
reforms across the student loan market, as described in detail
below. The Bureau has handled over 60,000 complaints from
student loan borrowers. 4 9 Through the Bureau's supervisory
authority, it has identified and halted a range of harmful practices
at student loan companies.so And perhaps most prominently, the
Bureau has taken enforcement action against several players in the
student loan market, including Wells Fargo, Discover, and

41

Id.; For further discussion see

CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR

LENDING REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

(Apr.

2017),

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201704_cfpbFairLendingRe
port.pdf ("Mortgage and Student Loan Servicing. We will evaluate whether
some borrowers who are behind on their mortgage or student loan payments
may have more difficulty working out a new solution with the servicer because
of their race, ethnicity, sex, or age.")
48 12 U.S.C. § 5531.
49 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB
2017),
(Oct.
OMBUDSMAN
LOAN
STUDENT
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb-annual-report-studentloan-ombudsman_2017.pdf [hereinafter 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB
STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN]. These complaints have also served as the
foundation or more than a dozen reports identifying consumer harm in the
student loan market. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN (Oct. 2012); CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN
OMBUDSMAN (Oct. 2013); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2014 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN (Oct. 2014); CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN
OMBUDSMAN (Oct. 2015); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 2016 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN (Oct. 2016).
5o See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS

2016),
(Fall
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/SupervisoryHighlightsIssue_1
3_Final_10.31.16.pdf; see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY

2014),
(Fall
HIGHLIGHTS
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201410_cfpb-supervisory-highlightsfall2014.pdf.
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Navient." Between 2011 and 2017, the Bureau's efforts in the
student loan market have returned more than $750 million to
borrowers.5 2
The collective body of Bureau actions, summarized above
and described in detail below, illustrates that, across the lifecycle
of a student loan, servicing errors routinely cause borrowers
significant financial harm. The design of the current student loan
system is such that servicing errors during even the most basic
servicing tasks cause unnecessary interest capitalization that can
result in hundreds or thousands of dollars being added to a
borrower's loan balance, loss of eligibility for or progress toward
loan forgiveness, and lost access to subsidies intended to lessen the
interest charged to student loan borrowers.s" Collectively, these
51 See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action
Against Wells Fargo for Illegal Student Loan Servicing Practices (Aug. 22,
2016),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takesaction-against-wells-fargo-illegal-student-loan-servicing-practices/;
Press
Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Orders Discover Bank to Pay
$18.5 Million for Illegal Student Loan Servicing Practices (July 22, 2015),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-discoverbank-to-pay-18-5-million-for-illegal-student-loan-servicing-practices/;
Press
Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Sues Nation's Largest Student
Loan Company Navient for Failing Borrowers at Every Stage of Repayment
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpbsues-nations-largest-student-loan-company-navient-failing-borrowers-everystage-repayment/.

52 CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROT. BUREAU,

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE

CFPB

STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1035 (Oct. 2017),

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpbannual-reportstudentloan-ombudsman_2017.pdf.
s3 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT
CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND
INNOVATION (July 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/2018-

08/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities-NonbankFinancials-Fintech-and-InnovationO.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM] ("Borrowers in the same financial situation
who contact two different servicers in the federal student
loan program to enroll in a more affordable repayment plan may end up with
different results and
advice, which may result in a financial impact on the borrowers. Federal student
loan servicers are
instructed to enroll borrowers looking to reduce their payments into the plan
that will cost the
borrower the least over time.").
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mistakes can result in hundreds of millions, or even billions, of
dollars of potential collective harm.s"
The Bureau's supervisory and law enforcement efforts
have identified a range of illegal acts and practices affecting every
type of borrower, with every type of loan, at every stage of
repayment. For example, through supervision, Bureau examiners
have cited a wide range of illegal practices that include:
* Unfairly denying, or failing to approve, income-driven
repayment plan applications that should have been
approved on a regular basis, causing borrowers to make
higher payments and subjecting them to unnecessary
interest capitalization.
* Failing to provide an effective choice on how payments
should be allocated among multiple loans where the
lack of choice can cause . a financial detriment to
consumers.5 6
* Deceiving borrowers who have made extra payments on
their loans about how much interest would accrue or
had accrued, and how that would affect the application
of consumers' payments when the borrower began
making payments again."
* Failing to reverse adverse consequences of erroneous
deferment terminations, including late fees charged for
non-payment during periods when the borrower should
have been in deferment, and interest capitalization that
occurred because the borrower's deferment was
erroneously terminated. 8
See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Sues
Nation's Largest Student Loan Company Navient for Failing Borrowers at
2017),
18,
(Jan.
Repayment
of
Stage
Every
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nationslargest-student-loan-company-navient-failing-borrowers-every-stagerepayment/ ("From January 2010 to March 2015, the company added up to $4
billion in interest charges to the principal balances of borrowers who were
enrolled in multiple, consecutive forbearances. The Bureau believes that a large
portion of these charges could have been avoided had Navient followed the
law.")
54

ss See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS (Fall

2016),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/1389/Supervisory-HighlightsIs
sue 13 _Final_10.31.16.pdf.
56 See id.
s7 See id.

" See CONSUMER FIN. PROT.

BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS
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*

Making
deceptive
statements
about
interest
capitalization
during successive
deferments
or
forbearances, when servicers capitalized interest after
each period of deferment or forbearance, instead of
capitalizing once when the borrower eventually
reentered repayment. 59
* Making misrepresentations to consumers that late fees
may be charged on loans held by the Department of
Education. While Department of Education loan notes
allow for the charging of late fees, the Department of
Education did not and does not charge late fees on its
loans and it instructs its servicers not to do so.6 0
* Failing to inform borrowers and co-signers that using
forbearance may delay, or even permanently foreclose,
eligibility for co-signer release."1
* Illegally increasing borrowers' interest rates following a
loan
sale
and
subsequent
internal
servicing
conversion.6
* Illegally auto-defaulting consumers when a loan's cosigner filed for bankruptcy, regardless of whether the
borrower was current on all payments, where the Whole
Loan Due clause was ambiguous.6 3
The CFPB has further alleged consumer harm in a variety
of enforcement actions related to student loan servicing practices.6 4
(Spring

2017),

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/4608/201704_cfpb-SupervisoryHighlightsIssue- 15.pdf.

s See id.
60

See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS (Fall

2015),
highlights.pdf.
61

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb-supervisory-

See CONSUMER FIN. PROT.

BUREAU,

SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS

(Winter 2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb supervisoryhighlights.pdf.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 The CFPB is not alone in alleging abuses by the student
loan industry.
In 2014, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the U.S. Department
of Justice each took an enforcement action against Sallie Mae and Navient for a
range of abuses, including violations of the Servicemember Civil Relief Act that
resulted in $60 million being returned to nearly 78,000 military borrowers. See,
e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nearly 78,000 Service Members to
Begin Receiving $60 Million Under Department of Justice Settlement with
Navient for Overcharging
on Student Loans (May 28, 2015),
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In 2015, the CFPB took action against Discover Bank
for providing misinformation on borrowers' billing
statements, inflating the minimum amount owed.6
The CFPB found that Discover was making illegal debt
collection calls to borrowers early in the morning and
late at night, often excessively.66
In 2016, the CFPB found that Wells Fargo was
allocating partial payments in a way that maximized
fees and failed to give consumers who are repaying two
or more loans effective choices about how to apply
payments. 7
In 2017, the CFPB took action against Navient
Corporation and its subsidiaries Navient Solutions and
Pioneer Credit Recovery. The Bureau alleges that
Navient illegally steered borrowers into forbearance-a
repayment option designed to assist borrowers
experiencing short-term financial hardship--when
borrowers have a right under federal law to enroll in
repayment plans that allow for lower monthly payments
over the long-term;68

https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/nearly-78000-service-members-beginstate
Further,
receiving-60-million-under-department-justice-settlement.
attorneys general have increased the volume of enforcement actions in this
market, bringing high profile cases against a range of actors. See, e.g., Press
Release, Wash. State Office of the Attorney General, AG Ferguson Files Suit
Against Sallie Mae Offshoot Navient Corp., Announces Student Loan Bill of
Rights Legislation (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/newsreleases/ag-ferguson-files-suit-against-sallie-mae-offshoot-navient-corpannounces-student; Complaint at 1, Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Higher
Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018 WL 1137520 (Mass.
Super. Mar. 1, 2018); Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Attorney General
James And Superintendent Vullo Announce $9 Million Settlement Of Federal
Student Loan Servicing Claims With Acs Education Services (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-james-and-superintendentvullo-announce-9-million-settlement-federal.
65 Discover Bank, The Student Loan Corporation, and Discover Products,
2015),
22,
(July
0016
2015-CFPBNo.
CFPB
Inc.,
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201507_cfpb-consent-order-in-the-matterof-discover-bank-student-loan-corporation.pdf.
66

Id

67

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013 (Aug. 22, 2016),

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/2016-CFPB0013WellsFargoBankN.A.-_ConsentOrder.pdf.
61 Complaint at ¶1-6, Consumer Fin. Protect. Bureau v. Navient Corp. et
2017),
18,
Jan
PA.
(M.D.
3:17-cv-00101-RDM
No.
Case
al.,
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The CFPB also alleges that Navient failed to properly
inform borrowers of the need to renew their incomedriven repayment plans and failed to properly process
those renewals, resulting in interest capitalization on
borrowers' loans; 6 9

*

The Bureau's investigation also found that Navient was
misreporting to credit bureaus loans discharged under
total and permanent disability discharge, including
loans owed by servicemembers and veterans with
service-connected disabilities;70
* The Bureau also alleges that Navient falsely
represented to borrowers with cosigned loans the
criteria for cosigner release and denied borrowers who
obtained the stated criteria."
* In late 2017, the Bureau took action against Citibank
for deceiving borrowers about tax-deduction benefits,
incorrectly charging late fees, and, like in the Discover
case, overstating the minimum amount owed.7 2
These examples illustrate the breadth of consumer harm
identified by the Bureau across the student loan market. When
considering the scope and authorities deployed when promulgating
a student loan servicing rule, past evidence of unfair, deceptive and
abusive acts and practices can offer regulators a potential
roadmap, as this paper explains in further detail in Parts IV and V
of this article. The Bureau took a precursory step in this direction
in 2015, predicated, in part, on the breadth of evidence
demonstrating rampant consumer harm in the student loan
market. The CFPB added student loan servicing to the Unified
Regulatory Agenda in 2015." At the time, the Bureau explained
that, "[s]tudent loan servicers are a critical link between borrowers
and lenders, yet there are no consistent, market-wide federal
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpbNavient-PioneerCredit-Recovery-complaint.pdf.
69 Id.
70 Id
71 Id
72 Press Release, CFPB Takes Action Against Citibank
For Student Loan
Servicing
Failures
That
Harmed
Borrowers,
(Nov.
21,
2017)
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-actionagainst-citibank-student-loan-servicing-failures-harmed-borrowers/.
13 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, RULEMAKING UNIFIED AGENDA, RIN

3170-AA55:
STUDENT
LOAN
SERVICING
(Fall
2015),
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?publd= 2015 10&RIN=3
170-AA55.
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standards for student loan servicing."1 4 It noted that the rule would
potentially include requirements around "specific acts or practices
and consumer disclosures."

5

However, in early 2018, Acting Director Mick Mulvaney
removed student loan servicing from the Bureau's rulemaking
agenda. 6 Since then, the Bureau has not publicly signaled any
intent on returning to a potential rulemaking in the student loan
market."

III. THE STRUCTURE AND FEATURES OF THE STUDENT
LOAN SERVICING MARKET MAKES CFPB
RULEMAKING NECESSARY TO PROTECT STUDENT
LOAN BORROWERS
Market features, economic incentives, the absence of a
market-wide baseline to standardize industry practices, and
limited opportunity for private enforcement in the event of errors
or abuses make the student loan servicing market prime for
regulatory action. These key elements combine to leave borrowers
trapped in a broken system plagued by practices that increase
borrowers' costs and routinely deprive borrowers of their
repayment rights. The following section briefly describes how each
of these elements supports the case for a CFPB rulemaking to
7

Kelly Cochran, Fall 2015 Rulemaking Agenda, CFPB (Nov. 20, 2015),

https://wwcw.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/fall-2015-rulemakingagenda]; ("Student loan servicers are a critical link between borrowers and
lenders, yet there are no consistent, market-wide federal standards for student
loan servicing. . . We will continue to monitor the market for trends and
developments and evaluate possible policy responses, including potentially
proposing rules. Possible topics for consideration might include specific acts or
practices and consumer disclosures."); see also Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
2015),
(Sept.
Servicing
Loan
Student
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb-student-loan-servicingreport.pdf [hereinafter STUDENT LOAN SERVICING].
" See Kelly Cochran, supra note 74.
7 Glenn Thrush & Stacy Cowley, Mulvaney Downgrade Student Loan
Unit in Consumer Bureau Shuffle, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/us/student-loans-consumer-financialprotection-bureau-cfpb.html?module=inline.
" See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Written Testimony of Kathy
Kraninger, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Before the House
Committee
on
Financial
Services
(Mar.
7,
2019),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg- 1 16-baOO-wstatekraningerk-20190307.pdf.
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protect student loan borrowers.
Student Loan ServicingMarket Features
Key features of the student loan servicing market
disempower borrowers and create opportunities for abuse. Student
loan borrowers cannot select the identity of their student loan
servicer and cannot change student loan servicers if they are
unsatisfied with the level of serviceoffered by their student loan
company." As a consequence, student loan servicers are largely
insulated from market forces, removing a key incentive to provide
high-quality service to student loan borrowers.7 9 Further,
observers have noted that the lack of competition and consumer
choice may drive poor outcomes for consumers-driving servicers
to tolerate an unacceptably high level of borrower distress and
default, rather than invest in assisting borrowers seeking to obtain
an affordable loan payment.s0
The Servicing Compensation Structure DiscouragesHighQualityService
Student loan servicers compensation structure discourages
high-quality, high-touch student loan servicing. As the CFPB
described in 2015, the student loan servicing industry, over time,
has adopted a business model based on cross-subsidization."
Companies charge loan holders a flat rate per borrower, per
'8 STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supranote 74 . . .a borrower typically has
little or no control over which company services their loan.")
79 See Susan Dynarski, An Economist's Perspective on Student Loans in
INSTITUTE
(Sept.
2014),
States,
BROOKINGS
the
United
http://www.brookings.edu/-/medialresearch/files/papers/2014/09/economist-pe
rspectivestudentloans-dynarski/economistperspective-student-loansdyna
rski.pdf (stating "Here we have a classic 'principal-agent' problem,
with the agent (the student loan servicers) having little incentive to act in the
best interests of the principal (the
federal government). Student loan servicers don't have much incentive to
prevent borrowers from defaulting, because the servicers either don't own the
underlying loans or, if they do, face few costs if a borrower defaults.
Restructuring a borrower's payments and preventing default requires effort,
and the beneficiary of this effort is the government and the student - not the
servicer.").
8
0

_[d

supra note 74 ("Economic incentives for
student loan servicers may contribute to limited utilization of income-driven
repayment plans.").
8' STUDENT LOAN SERVICING,
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month, irrespective of the level of service demanded by an
individual customer.82 When setting rates, companies must
anticipate the share of borrowers who will require significant
assistance by customer service representatives and the share of
borrowers who will make payments on time each month and
demand little in the way of personalized service. In effect,
revenue generated by a large volume of "low-touch" borrowers is
intended to offset the significant cost to servicers associated with
providing personalized service to a minority of "high touch"
borrowers. 84 While this business model may make sense in the
abstract, persistent, high levels of student loan borrower distress
can make this economic model financially disastrous for industry
and create a powerful disincentive for servicers to provide
adequate customer service to all borrowers in need."
82 The CFPB described this structure in 2015: "This monthly servicing fee
may be set as a flat dollar amount per month per account, or set based on a
percentage of a borrower's aggregate principal balance. In both cases, the fee
paid to student loan servicers may vary depending on repayment status
(generally rising as borrowers transition from "in school" to "in grace" to "in
repayment") but generally do not vary depending on the level of service
provided in a given month." See, e.g., First Marblehead Corporation,

PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT: THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN

TRUST

2007-3

(Sept.

17,

2007),

http://www.snl.com/interactivellookandfeel/4094003/NCSLT2007_3_FPS.PD
F; Title IVRedacted ContractAwards 12-13, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION (last
19,
2019),
https://www.fbo.gov/spg/ED/FSA/CA/FSAvisited
June
TitleIVO9/listing.html. For Direct Loans, contracts fix monthly compensation
on a per-borrower basis, and the
compensation depends on the repayment status of each borrower being serviced.
See also, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUCATION, STUDENT AID ADMINISTRATION FISCAL YEAR 2015 REQUEST at

AA-15, http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budgetl5/justificationslaasaadmin.pdf (estimating the average cost per-borrower to be $1.67 per month,
based on the contractual prices and the proportion of borrowers with different
repayment statuses).
83

_[d
84 Id.

s For

further

RECOMMENDATIONS

discussion,
ON

BEST

see

U.S.

PRACTICES

DEP'T
IN

OF

EDUCATION,

PERFORMANCE-BASED

CONTRACTING (2015), available at http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/loans/repay/bestpractices-recommendations.pdf; see also ASS'N OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE
TRUSTEES, COLLEEN CAMPBELL & NICHOLAS HILLMAN, A CLOSER LOOK AT
THE TRILLION: BORROWING, REPAYMENT, AND DEFAULT AT IOWA'S

COMMUNITY COLLEGE (Sept. 2015), available at
http://www.acct.org/files/Publications/2015/ACCTBorrowing-Repayment-
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The Student Loan Servicing Market Lacks Market-Wide
Baseline Standards
The absence of baseline standards yields inconsistent
practices across the industry and drives disparate outcomes for
similarly situated student loan borrowers. Borrowers often
encounter significantly different practices at different servicers,
despite having rights to the same federal protections. For example,
borrowers searching for loan information on servicers' websites or
seeking information directly from customer service representatives
may receive incompatible, conflicting, or contradictory advicestymying borrowers' efforts to access their rights under the law.8 6
Further, as the U.S. Department of the Treasury explains, "federal
borrowers have also faced financial harm in even more
straightforward circumstances, such as the application of overand underpayments. Some servicers have not provided borrowers
the ability to direct payments to a specific loan or have not fully
implemented guidance from [the Department of] Education on
how to process over- and underpayments."'I As a result, borrowers
face obstacles at every stage of repayment, and one study suggests
that their ultimate repayment success is more reflective of their
servicer rather than where they went to school or if they
graduated."
The Higher Education Act does not Provide Borrowers with a
Private Right of Action
Federal higher education law does not provide borrowers
with a private remedy to address breakdowns when they occur.89
Despite far-reaching and powerful protections against economic
distress, including income-driven repayment and debt cancellation
options, student loan borrowers continue to struggle and default at
near-historic levels. Observers have attributed this persistent
distress, in part, to the limited mechanisms available to consumers
when a student loan servicer fails to effectively and timely
facilitate access to borrowers' repayment rights." Specifically,
IowaCCs_09-28-2015.pdf.
86 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 53;
STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supranote 74.
" U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supranote 53.
88 Ass'N OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE TRUSTEES, supra
note 85.

See generally, 20 U.S.C. § 1070 et seq.
See, e.g., Nat'1 Consumers Law Center, Comments on Reauthorization
of the Higher Education Act of 1965
89

90
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under the Higher Education Act of 1965, these repayment rights
are only enforceable by the Secretary of Education, leaving
borrowers with little legal recourse under federal higher education
law if their rights are improperly denied. 91 The absence of a federal
cause of action creates a powerful incentive for the student loan
industry to maximize profits at the expense of borrowers' rights, as
described in the preceding section of this paper.
Taken together, a review of the structure and features of
the student loan servicing market, coupled with the broad and
economically devastating consumer harm identified by the CFPB
across the industry, make a compelling case for regulatory action
by the CFPB to be a top priority for the Bureau. As the following
section discusses in detail, the CFPB has the authority under
current law to take such an action, addressing the structural flaws
above.
abuses
detailed
and
widespread

IV. THE CFPB'S AUTHORITY TO WRITE A STUDENT
LOAN SERVICING RULE
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act gives the Bureau extensive
discretionary rule writing authorities. The Bureau can write a
student loan servicing rule based on its existing authorities to
address many of the harms in the market. Two rule writing
provisions in particular give the Bureau ample authority to
implement regulations in this market: Dodd-Frank Act § 1031,92
the Bureau's authority to prescribe rules identifies UDAAP, and
Dodd-Frank Act § 1032,93 the Bureau's authority to prescribe
to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (Feb. 23,
https://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/wp2018),
content/uploads/2018/02/comments-senate-help-re-hea-reauth.pdf ("The HEA
does not explicitly state that students and borrowers have the right to enforce
their rights under the. Act. Because the Act is silent about whether students or
borrowers have a "private right of action," many entities have argued and some
courts have decided-to the detriment of students and borrowers-that the
HEA provides no such right of private enforcement.").
1 Id. Readers should note that individual borrowers and classes of
borrowers can sue to enforce state prohibitions on unfair and deceptive
practices, where the denial of borrowers' rights under federal higher education
law rises to the level of unfairness or deception. See, e.g., Hyland v. Navient,
at
2018),
available
(S.D.N.Y.
No.
1:18-cv-09031
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/7974080/hyland-v-navient-corporation/.
92 12 U.S.C. § 5531.
9
12 U.S.C. § 5532.
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disclosure rules. Drawing on these two authorities combined, the
Dodd-Frank Act granted the Bureau far-reaching authority to
address consumer harms in the student loan servicing market
through rulemaking. As discussed further below, the two
authorities complement each other and would work well together
to address harms in the student loan servicing market.
Section 1031: Unfair, Deceptive, Abusive Acts or Practices
Section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that "[t]he
Bureau may prescribe rules applicable to a covered person or
service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with
a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the
offering of a consumer financial product or service."9 4 The section
further provides that "[r]ules under this section may include
requirements for the purpose of preventing such acts or
practices.""s This broad provision gives the Bureau ample
authority to identify UDAAPs and impose requirements to prevent
them.
Although the Bureau's authority is broad, it is derived from
authority other agencies have exercised for decades. The Bureau's
UDAAP rule writing authority is derived from the Federal Trade
Commission's ("FTC") authority under §§ 5 and 18 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.96 The FTC has used its authority to write
rules identifying market failures and prescribing requirements to
prevent them." The Federal Banking agencies" also had authority
to write rules under § 5 of the FTC Act for the entities they
regulated until that provision was repealed by the Dodd-Frank

94

12 U.S.C. § 5531(b).

96
15 U.S.C. § 45; 15 U.S.C. § 57a (authorizing the FTC to prescribe "rules
which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce" within the meaning of § 5(a)(1) of the FTC
Act). The FTC does not have authority to identify abusive practices under § 5,
so the Bureau's authority under § 1031 is more expansive in that way than the

FTC's.
.*1
See, e.g., Business Opportunity Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 437.1-437.10; Credit
Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1-444.5; Funeral Industry Practice, 16 C.F.R.

§§ 453.1-453.9.
9 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board,
the National Credit Union Administration, and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency.
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Unfairness
Section 1031 defines unfairness by limiting the Bureau's
authority to declare acts or practices unfair unless the act or
practice meet three elements. First, the act or practice must cause
or be likely to cause "substantial injury."" Second, that injury
must not be "reasonably avoidable by consumers."o And, third,
the substantial injury must not be "outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition."1 0 2
Because the Bureau's unfairness authority mirrors the
FTC's, there are decades of case law, official policy statements,
guidance, and enforcement actions based on the prongs of
unfairness.1 o 3 The FTC developed its unfairness doctrine in its
Policy Statement, even prior to its codification in the FTC Act."0 4
Any student loan servicing rule by the Bureau would be rooted in
this precedent and based on similar considerations.
Deception
Unlike unfairness, deception is not defined or described in
either the FTC Act or the Dodd-Frank Act. However, the FTC
issued a Policy Statement on deception, similar to its Unfairness
Policy Statement, in 1983.0s The FTC Policy Statement provides
that an act or practice is deceptive if: 1) there was "representation,
omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer"; 06 2)
" See 81 Fed. Reg. 8133 (Feb. 18, 2016) (repealing UDAP regulations
written under the prudential regulators' authority under § 5 of the FTC Act
because § 1092(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act repealed section 18(f)(1) of the FTC
Act, thus eliminating the prudential regulators' rule writing authority under the

FTC Act).
'"

12 U.S.C. § 5531(c).

102

Id

101 M

15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
104 FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, Appended to International
at
available
(1984),
1070
949,
F.T.C.
104
Co.,
Harvester
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statementunfairness.
1os FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Appended to Cliffdale Associates,
at
available
(1984),
174
110,
F.T.C.
103
Inc.,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/publicstatements/410531/831014
deceptionstmt.pdf [hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on Deception].
103

106

Id
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the consumer was "acting reasonably in the circumstances";1 o7 and
3) "the representation, omission, or practice must be a 'material'
one."'o Numerous cases have followed the FTC's policy statement
on deception.' 0 9 The Bureau has noted that in its UDAAP exam
procedures that cases under the FTC Act, as well as policy
statements, guidance, exam procedures, and enforcement actions
by the federal banking regulators and the FTC, "may inform the
CFPB."" 0 The Bureau has also noted that its examiners should be
informed by the FTC's standard for deception."'
Abusiveness
Unlike unfairness and deception, the Bureau's authority to
declare acts and practices abusive is not drawn from the FTC Act.
However, abusiveness is clearly laid out in the Dodd-Frank Act.
There are different prongs of abusiveness laid out in §
1031(a)(1)(B):
* Materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to
understand a term or condition of a consumer financial
product or service
* Takes unreasonable advantage of:
o A lack of understanding on the part of the consumer
of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the
product or service;
o The inability of the consumer to protect its interests
in selecting or using a consumer financial product
or service; or
o The reasonable reliance by the consumer on a
covered person to act in the interests of the
consumer.112
The Bureau relied on its abusiveness authority, as well as
its unfairness authority, in its first UDAAP rule. In its Payday,
Vehicle Title, and Certain High Cost Installment Loans rule the
Bureau identified two unfair and abusive practices: lending certain
Id
Id.
10' See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009); F.T.C.
v. Cyberspace.Com LLC, 453 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9 Cir. 2006).
110 CFPB, EXAMINATION PROCEDURES, UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE AND
n.2
(Oct.
2012),
PRACTICES
at
1,
ABUSIVE
ACTS
OR
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102012_cfpb-unfair-deceptiveabusive-acts-practices-udaaps-procedures.pdf.
107

108

n
112

Id. at 5,5n.10.

12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B).

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

576

Vol. 31:3

types of loans without reasonably determining that consumers
have the ability to repay the loans according to their terms
("Underwriting Provisions") and, for certain types of loan, making
attempts to withdraw payment from consumers' accounts after
two consecutive payment attempts have failed, unless the
consumer provides a new and specific authorization to do so
("Payments Provisions").11 3 The Bureau relied on both the lack of
understanding of material risks and costs prong of abusiveness and
the inability to protect interests prong of abusiveness. 1 14 The
Bureau has subsequently proposed to rescind its findings of unfair
and abusive practices with respect to the Underwriting
Provisions.1 15 However, the Bureau has not proposed to rescind the
unfairness and abusiveness findings with respect to the Payments
Provisions, which are scheduled to go into effect on August 19,
2019 or when a judicial stay issued by a federal district court in the
Western District of Texas is lifted."' The discussion of unfairness
and abusiveness in the Payments Provisions findings of the Payday
Rule is instructive because it is the only UDAAP rule the Bureau
has done to date that is not likely to be rescinded by the Bureau.
The Bureau could draw on the analysis and type of findings it
made in the Payments Provisions to write UDAAP rules in the
student loan servicing market.
Application of UDAAPin student loan servicing enforcement
and supervision by the Bureau
As described in detail in the preceding section, the Bureau
has identified numerous unfair, deceptive, and abusive.practices in
the student loan servicing market through its enforcement and
supervisory activities. These finding could help form the basis for
a UDAAP rulemaking in this space.
Most prominently, the Bureau sued Navient on January 18,
2018, alleging eight different UDAAPs (as well as violations of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ["FDCPA"] and Regulation V
113
114

82 Fed. Reg. 54,472, 54,615-24 (Nov. 17, 2017).

Id.
s1584 Fed. Reg. 4252, (Feb. 14, 2019); see also Proposed Rule: Payday,

Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, CONSUMER FIN.
BUREAU (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policycompliance/rulemaking/rules-under-development/payday-vehicle-title-andcertain-high-cost-installment-loans/
"6 84 Fed. Reg. 4253; see Order Staying Compliance Date, Community Fin.
Service of Am. v. Consumer Prot. Fin. Bureau, No. 1:18-cv-00295-LY, at 1
(W.D.Tex. Mar. 9, 2019).
PROT.
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of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ["FCRA])."' Of particular
relevance in the context of potential rulemaking, the Bureau
alleged that Navient steered borrowers into costly forbearance
without advising them about other, more appropriate, repayment
options, as it promised to do on its website.11 8 The District Court
held that the Bureau had stated a claim that this was both an
unfair and abusive (reasonable reliance) practice.11 9 The District
Court also held that the Bureau had stated a claim for an unfair
practice related to Navient's electronic recertification notices'2 0
and a deceptive practice related to Navient's mailed recertification
notices.12 1 The District Court also found that the Bureau had stated
a claim for a deceptive practice under § 1031 of the Dodd-Frank
Act and under the FDCPA for statements made about the
rehabilitation process.12 2
The Bureau has found that certain practices relating to the
application and aggregation of payments are unfair practices and
these findings could help indicate market failures that the Bureau
could address by rule. For example, as described above, the
Bureau settled administratively with Wells Fargo over unfair and
deceptive practices related to its private student loan servicing
practices. 12 3 The Bureau found that it was an unfair practice for
Wells Fargo to fail to disclose its payment allocation methodology
to consumers and the ability to provide payment instructions on
how to allocate payments, while allocating partial payments
towards grouped loan accounts in a manner that maximized late
fees incurred by many consumers.12 4 The Bureau also found that
Wells Fargo's failure to aggregate multiple partial payments
submitted by consumers within the same billing cycle, where the
payments, if aggregated, would have satisfied the total amount due
for that loan's billing cycle, and its failure to refund or waive any
resulting improper late fees assessed was an unfair practice.12 5
Further, the Bureau's supervision program routinely
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017
WL 3380530, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
117

11

Id. at 19.

Id. at 19-21.
Id. at 21-23.
121 Id. at 23-24.
122 Id. at 24-26.
123 Wells Fargo Bank N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013
(Aug. 22, 2016) at
9.
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/2016-CFPB0013WellsFargoBankN.A.-_ConsentOrder.pdf.
119
120

124

Id

125

Id. at 14-15.
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examines the breadth of servicers' operations to assess compliance
with the prohibition on unfair, deceptive and abusive acts and
practices, focusing on key features of the student loan repayment
process including the processing of income-driven repayment plan
paperwork, communication related to federal and contractual
benefits and protections, and the processing of borrowers' loan
payments.1 2 6 Bureau examiners have determined that student loan
servicers committed unfair and deceptive practices, as outlined
above, with respect to each of these broad categories of industry
Bureau keeps supervisory information
practices. 12 7 The
shares key findings from its
periodically
but
confidential
28
supervisory work.'1 These findings could support identification of
these or related unfair and deceptive practices in a Bureau rule on
student loan servicing under its UDAAP authority.
Section 1032 disclosure authority
In addition to its broad rule writing authority under § 1031,
the Bureau also has authority to require disclosures under § 1032
of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 1032 permits Bureau to write rules
"to ensure that the features of any consumer financial product or
service, both initially and over the term of the product or service,
are fully, accurately, and effectively disclosed to consumers in a
manner that permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits,
and risks associated with the product or service, in light of the facts
and circumstances."1 29 As discussed below, this broad provision of
authority permits the Bureau to require timely and effective
disclosures and requires testing of model forms to ensure they
actually are conveying the information to consumers so that the
information is understood.
Of course, disclosures are not a cure for many market
failures, system problems, or illegal acts or practices. Even the
most effective disclosures cannot completely protect borrowers,
particularly from UDAAPs like those discussed above. 0 But when
Education loan examination procedures, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (last updated June 22, 2618),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/supervisionexaminations/education-loan-examination-procedures/.
127 See infra Part U.
128 For further discussion, see infra PartII.
129 12 U.S.C. § 5532.
130 State attorneys general have alleged similar steering claims as those
alleged by the Bureau against Navient. Courts have repeatedly found that those
claims are not "disclosure requirements" under a provision of the Higher
126
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used in conjunction with the Bureau's UDAAP rule writing
authority under § 1031 as discussed above, § 1032 may be a
powerful tool to protect student loan borrowers by providing them
with carefully chosen information in a format and at a time that
they can best use that information.
Section 1032 permits the Bureau to time disclosures for
when they would be most helpful to student loan borrowers. The
provision provides that the Bureau may require disclosures "over
the term of the product or service," which makes clear that the
Bureau could require disclosures about any aspect of the servicing
of student loans, from leaving the grace period to default
prevention."' It also provides that the disclosures will enable
borrowers to "understand the costs, benefits, and risks ... in light
of the facts and circumstances."1 3 2 The Bureau might interpret this
authority to allow for flexible or tailored disclosures, that are
triggered by certain events, such as a missed payment triggering a
disclosure about income-based repayment or an expression of
interest in public service loan forgiveness for a borrower who was
not in an eligible repayment plan triggering a disclosure about
enrollment in eligible repayment plans. The Bureau has previously
highlighted problems at every stage of the life cycle of servicing of
student loans.' Section 1032 would permit the Bureau to time
disclosures to provide student loan borrowers with information
they could use to protect themselves. This authority would be
particularly powerful when used in conjunction with prohibitions
on UDAAPs in the market, so that consumers were both protected
and, where consumer choice is needed, properly informed.
Education Act that preempts such requirements under state law. State of Illinois
v. Navient, 17-CH-761 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty Ill. Ch. Div., July 10, 2018);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37, Washington v. Navient Corp., No. 17-201115-1 SEA (Wash. Sup. Ct. July 7, 2017). Some cases involving individual
borrowers' claims have held that steering claims are "disclosure requirements,"
but their reasoning is not well-developed. Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan
Servs., No. 3:17-CV-183, 2017 WL 6501919, at *4 (S.D. Ill., Dec. 19, 2017). In
this case, the 71 Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this holding and overturned
the trial court's decision. Nelson v. Great Lakes Educational Loan Services,
Inc., No. 18-1531 (7th Cir. June 27, 2019). The Bureau's provision of disclosures
would not be preempted by the HEA. A disclosure rule by the Bureau under §
1032 would not substitute for identification and prevention of UDAAPs, but
would instead complement that the exercise of that authority.
131 12 U.S.C. § 5532.
132 12 U.S.C. §
5532.
133

2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN,

supra note 49.
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Section 1032 provides the Bureau with authority to ensure
that any disclosures it requires actually provide borrowers about
information they need to know. Section 1032(a) explicitly provides
the Bureau the authority to require that student loan servicers
"fully, accurately, and effectively" disclose the "features" of the
consumer financial product or service to borrowers. 1 3 4 (emphasis
added). In addition, § 1032(b) permits the Bureau to prescribe
model forms for its required disclosures. Model forms must "use[]
plain language comprehensible to consumers," "contain[] a clear
format and design," and "succinctly explains the information that
must be communicated to the consumer."' These requirements
would ensure that model forms are drafted to ensure that
consumers understand the intended message of the disclosure.
Section 1032 goes even further to ensure the model forms are
appropriately drafted by requiring that model forms "shall be
validated through consumer testing."1 36 Rigorous consumer testing
will help the Bureau ensure that student loan borrowers
understand the import of disclosures they receive. Student loan
servicers likely would support the use of model forms in a Bureau
disclosure rule because § 1032(d) provides a safe harbor for
compliance if student loan servicers use the Bureau's model
form.1 37
The Bureau will need to develop an evidentiary basis for
disclosures it requires pursuant to its § 1032 authority. In addition
to the regular APA requirements for rulemaking, § 1032(c) requires
that the Bureau "consider available evidence about consumer
awareness, understanding of, and responses to disclosures or
communications about the risks, costs, and benefits of consumer
financial products or services. "'1 The Bureau likely could draw on
internal expertise and published literature on disclosures generally
and in the student loan context to support disclosure requirements
it imposed under § 1032.
The Bureau has relied on § 1032 in conjunction with other
disclosure authorities and on its own to impose disclosure
requirements. 139 In the Bureau's Small Dollar Rule, the Bureau
interpreted § 1032 to provide that "the Bureau may prescribe rules

13
135
136
137
138

12
12
12
12
12

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 5532(a).
§ 5532(b).
§ 5532(c).
§ 5532(d).
§ 5532(c).

139 See, e.g., Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Truth in Lending Act
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 10902, 10916 (Feb. 14, 2013).
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containing disclosure requirements even if other Federal consumer
financial laws do not specifically require disclosure of such
features."14 0 The Bureau could expect to get Chevron deference for
interpretations of the provisions of § 1032 discussed above, if it
issued an interpretation that satisfied the requirements for
deference.
V. THE SUBSTANCE AND SCOPE OF A UDAAP- AND
DISCLOSURE-BASED STUDENT LOAN SERVICING
RULEMAKING
In defining the parameters of a student loan servicing rule,
this article recommends the Bureau consider the following
interventions. While this list is not exhaustive of interventions the
Bureau may consider addressing via a student loan servicing rule,
the following topics are areas where consumer injury has
previously been identified, and where a servicing rule could stem
harmful practices by servicers.
Postingand Handlingof Payments
While loan servicing is critical for consumers with other
types of credit, borrowers with student loans are particularly
dependent on student loan servicers to timely and accurately
process payments and to clearly communicate payment handling
procedures to ensure borrowers have the information necessary to
successfully repay these debts.14 ' Failure by servicers to properly
apply payments can result in significant financial harm to the
borrower, including interest capitalization, late fees, loss of loan
benefits like cosigner release, or even loss of long-term repayment
protections like Public Service Loan Forgiveness.' 4 2 A student loan
servicing rulemaking should include new standards to ensure
payments are timely and accurately processed, requiring payments
be posted to borrowers' accounts effective the date on which they
are received, and requiring servicers "hold harmless" any
payments submitted in accordance with prior servicer instructions,
even when a servicer changes its internal payment handling
policies.' 4 3 These new standards can be accompanied by a robust
140
141

142

82 Fed. Reg. 54,521-22 (2017).

STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 74.
See infra Part II; see also STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supranote 74.

143 In 2009, Congress enacted the Credit CARD Act, addressing a similar
set of issues by establishing strong standards to govern the crediting and posting
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disclosure regime to ensure borrowers' understand their rights and
servicers obligations under these new rules.
Allocation of Payments
Unique among major classes of consumer debt, student
loan borrowers typically repay multiple student loans owed to the
44
same creditor and managed by the same student loan servicer.'
These loans are combined, or "grouped" together in a single loan
account and borrowers typically receive a single billing statement
with one amount due for all loans. Because borrowers' debts are
legally a series of individual financial obligations, but are serviced
as one combined account, servicers typically develop their own
internal policies for directing or "allocating" payments across these
individual loans.
As previously discussed, enforcement and supervisory
actions by the Bureau reveal a wide range of predatory practices
by servicers stemming from how payments are allocated across
accounts, including maximizing late fees charged to borrowers,
increasing interest charges, and damaging borrowers' credit
profiles.14 5 A student loan servicing rulemaking should include new
standards that govern the allocation of payments to borrowers'
accounts, ensuring that partial payments and prepayments are
applied in borrowers' best financial interests.
Billing Statements and Payment Histories
As discussed above, there are currently no federal standards
governing the routine billing communications sent by student loan
servicers to borrowers and borrowers do not have the right to
demand basic information about their loan accounts. In effect,
even basic functions such as the timing and content of billing
statements are determined at the discretion of loan servicers,
ensuring that the identity of a borrower's student loan company
determines how often he or she receives basic information,
including how much debt is outstanding, how payments have been
applied and what late fees and interest charges have been assessed.
As a consequence, borrowers often lack the information necessary
to monitor their progress when repaying their loans or pursuing a
of payments. Regulators may wish to look to the CARD Act for an instructive
analogy when promulgating regulations to govern similar practices in the
student loan servicing market. See P.L. 111-24.
144

STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 74.
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See infra Part HI.
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wide range of loan features that depend on accurate recordkeeping. This creates significant barriers to repayment, costing
some borrowers thousands of dollars in lost eligibility for interest
subsidies, loan forgiveness, and other protections and benefits. 14 6
State and federal law enforcement officials have identified
a range of problems stemming from opaque, confusing, or
improper servicer communications about borrowers' accounts,
suggesting that borrowers would benefit from comprehensive,
baseline standards across the industry.14 7 A student loan servicing
rulemaking should require monthly billing statements that contain
clear information about borrowers' outstanding balances, interest
charges, payments received, payments due, and progress toward
protections or benefits tracked by the loan servicer. Further, a
student loan rulemaking should provide borrowers and cosigners
with an affirmative right to access complete information about
borrowers' accounts, including histories of payments and records
related to payments, charges, disputes, and other interactions with
loan servicers.
Alternative Repayment Arrangements
For the vast majority of borrowers with a federal student
loan, the federal Higher Education Act provides an entitlement to
make loan payments pegged to a borrower's income.' 4 8 In
circumstances where a borrower is unemployed or receives low
wages, a "payment" under these options may be as low as zero
dollars per month-offering borrowers a powerful protection
against financial distress and default.14 9 However, significant
evidence, including many of the abuses described in the preceding
section of this paper, demonstrates how servicing practices inhibit
borrowers' ability to access or benefit from these options."so
Options for vulnerable borrowers extend beyond programs
146

For

further discussion see Domino: A Blog About Student Debt,

STUDENT

BORROWER

PROTECTION

CTR.,

https://protectborrowers.org/qualifying-payments/.
147 See infra Part II. For further discussion see, e.g., CFPB v. Navient
Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM (M.D. Pa., filed Jan. 18, 2017); State of Illinois
v. Navient, 17-CH-761 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty Ill. Ch. Div., July 10, 2018);
Washington v. Navient Corp., No. 17-2-01115-1 SEA (Wa. Sup. Ct. July 7,
2017); see also Student Loan Payback Playbook, CFPB (last visited May 29,
2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/payback-playbook/.
"1 For further discussion, see STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 74.
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that provide payment relief-borrowers are entitled to a wide
range of debt cancellation and loan forgiveness programs, and, in
each instance, are similarly dependent on their student loan
15 1
servicers to provide accurate information and facilitate access.
Not only do student loan borrowers rely on servicers to tell
them about the availability of these options, but they are
specifically instructed by the Department of Education to contact
their servicer to learn about available repayment and debt
cancellation options. 15 2 In effect, student loan servicers are paid to
act as gatekeepers to the myriad features of student loans,
particularly federal student loans, that purport to make these
financial products safe for consumers.
A student loan servicing rulemaking should set standards
for routine communications related to alternative repayment
arrangements, requiring that servicers who advise borrowers
about their rights and benefits do so in a manner that considers
borrowers' financial circumstances and operates in borrowers'
financial interests, rather than in the financial interests of the
servicer or the loan holder. Further, a student loan servicing
rulemaking should set standards for the processing of applications
and other paperwork related to alternative repayment
arrangements, ensuring servicers do not improperly deny
borrowers' applications and instead communicate with borrowers
about key deadlines, the status of applications, and other
paperwork.
Servicing Transfers
Over the last decade, approximately 10 million borrower
accounts were transferred to new servicers.15 3 As the FFELP loan
market continues to consolidate and as the number of federal
student loan servicers continues to dwindle, this number will only
increase. Further, a planned restructuring of the federal
See STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 74.
See STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supranote 74, at 19, 92 ("Student loan
servicers' successful administration of [borrower benefit] programs may depend
in part on their capacity to accurately inform borrowers of available options.
Consequently, well-conceived consumer protections may not be effective absent
high-quality student loan servicing. . . . Borrowers rely on their servicer to
provide information about repayment options . . ").
" CFPB Concerned About Widespread Servicing FailuresReported by
Student Loan Borrowers, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-concerned-aboutwidespread-servicing-failures-reported-by-student-loan-borrowers/.
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government's servicing contracts is expected to trigger a large scale
servicing transfer, causing more than 37 million student loan
borrowers' loans to change companies.15 4 This presents a vast and
emergent risk to these borrowers' financial lives, given the wide
range of negative consequences following servicing transfers,
including lost paperwork, missing records and loan documents,
and disruptions in the process of applying for affordable loan
payments and other benefits.'
A student loan servicing rulemaking should protect
borrowers from any negative consequences stemming from such a
transfer, including but not limited to 1) negative credit reporting,
or 2) denial of eligibility for any benefit or protection established
under federal law or included in a loan contract, as a result of a
payment made to their old servicer, consistent with their old
servicer's policy. Further, a student loan servicing rulemaking
should require all necessary information accompany a loan when
it transfers, ensuring borrowers do not lose access to important
records. This should include, at minimum:
* Schedule of all transactions credited or debited to the
student loan account;
* A copy of the promissory note for the student loan;
* Any notes created by servicer personnel reflecting
communications with the borrower about the student
loan account;
* A report of the data fields relating to the borrower's
student loan account created by the servicer's electronic
systems in connection with servicing practices;
* Copies of any information or documents provided by
the borrower to the servicer;
* Usable data fields with information necessary to assess
qualification for forgiveness including Public Service
Loan Forgiveness; and
* Any information necessary to compile a payment
history.
1

See Persis Yu, Student Loan ForgivenessCannot Work Without a Right

to a Payment History, STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR. (May 22, 2019),

https://protectborrowers.org/qualifying-payments ("The Trump Administration
has raised the stakes for tens of millions of borrowers, pulling down planned
consumer protections while advancing a sweeping new proposal that will cause
more than 37 million borrowers' loans to change companies in the coming
years."); see also U.S. Dep't of Education, Solicitation/Contract/Order for
Commercial
Items,
https://www.fbo.gov/utils/view?id=flea5ae6a55d0c74209faa9ab1d225c8.
s Id.
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Assisting MilitaryBorrowers
Military borrowers have rights under federal and state laws
that provide for interest rate reductions, loan forgiveness, and
other consumer protections designed to lessen the burden of
student debt. 15 6 Unfortunately, the student loan industry has
served as an obstacle to borrowers' seeking to invoke their rights,
both through illegal practices and through routine, substandard
customer service. 15 A student loan servicing rulemaking should
address the unique risks facing military borrowers, prohibiting the
specific types of abuses identified in past enforcement actions,
including banning imposition of additional, unnecessary
administrative requirements on military borrowers seeking to
invoke their rights. Further, such a rulemaking should require
student loan servicers to proactively identify military borrowers
and provide specialized resources and specially trained personnel
to provide direct assistance.
The preceding topics for a potential rulemaking offer a
roadmap for regulators to address specific industry practices and
market features where significant consumer harm has occurred.
These topics are not necessarily comprehensive and a thorough
and diligent rulemaking process-guided by the Administrative
Procedures Act and informed by market developments that may
occur subsequent to the publication of this article-may spur the
Bureau to take a more expansive approach, setting standards for
practices in addition to those discussed above.

VI. CONCLUSION
The student loan market has reached unprecedented levels
of debt, which is only made more perilous by illegal practices by
For further discussion, see Hollister Petraeus & Seth Frotman, Overseas
& Underserved: Student Loan Servicing and the Cost to Our Men and Women
(July 2015),
in Uniform, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201507-cfpb-overseas-underservedstudent-loan-servicing-and-the-cost-to-our-men-and-women-in-uniform.pdf.
157 See, e.g,, Consent Order, United States v. Sallie Mae, Inc. et. Al, Case
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student loan servicers. The impact on the broader financial health
of tens of millions of Americans demonstrates that the need for a
student loan servicing rulemaking is emergent and dire.158 The
Bureau should be using every tool at its disposal to protect student
loan borrowers across the market. This necessarily means
prioritizing a broad-based rulemaking to set standards for the
student loan servicing industry.
Such a rulemaking need not be controversial. The sheer
magnitude of the student debt crisis unfolding across America
should render any effort to fix it beyond the reach of the gridlock
and dysfunction that characterizes our current hyper-partisan
political environment. The Bureau was created because the
mortgage crisis led to broad-based financial fallout-and the
current state of the student loan market is no different. Currently,
11 million consumers have seen their credit profiles severely
damaged due to loan defaults and delinquencies that are
preventable and needless-in effect, this damage is the direct result
of student loan market failures."'
The population of borrowers who have fallen behind on
their student loan payments likely understates the breadth of the
student debt crisis. The burden of student debt effects the lives and
livelihoods of consumers in myriad ways-diminishing household
wealth, shaping career decisions and household formation, and
increasing economic inequality.16 0 For millions of Americans,
student debt will cause a ripple of harm across their financial
lives-harm that could be prevented if these borrowers were able
to access to the very protections designed to mitigate financial
hardship caused by student debt and prevent distress, including
delinquencies and defaults.'6 1
While the best course of action is for the CFPB to engage
immediately in a student loan servicing rulemaking, there is
considerable work that can be done in the near-term if the Bureau
's
See Seth Frotman, Broken Promises: How Debt-financed Higher
Education Rewrote America's Social Contract and Fueled a Quiet Crisis, 2018
Utah L. Rev. 811, 811 (2018).
' Author's analysis of administrative data released by the U.S.
Department of Education's Office of Federal Student Aid. See FederalStudent
Aid Data Center, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION (last visited June 6, 2019),
https://studentaid.ed.gov/salabout/data-center/student/portfolio.
160 For further discussion, see Frotman, supra note
158.
161 Daniel Herbst, Liquidityand Insurancein StudentLoan Contracts:
The
Effects of Income-Driven Repayment on Borrower Outcomes 1, 2 (updated
available
at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/lAMar.
12,
2019),
gqLIqffY6r2gDTcUK9-Y3ZV8Go6SU/view.
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continues to ignore growing evidence of the broken and
dysfunctional student loan servicing marketplace and pursue its
current course of inaction. Researchers can work to ensure that
robust data and objective analysis exists to substantiate market
failures and provide critical groundwork for a future Bureau
leadership inclined to take regulatory action in the student loan
servicing market. Researchers across the country are pursuing this
important foundational work-academic, federal, state, and even
local research on the disparate impact of student loan servicing
breakdowns will prove critical in any future rulemaking effort.
State supervision and enforcement actions will further
demonstrate consumer harm in this market and serve as an
important basis for substantive federal rules. Additionally,
policymakers and researchers should study the effectiveness of
injunctive relief by state law enforcement and regulators, and
conduct additional studies to assess the most effective policy
interventions to eliminate the harmful servicing. breakdowns.
Regulators and law enforcement officials continue to take
steps to address individual illegal practices across the student loan
marketplace. This law enforcement and supervisory work is
essential, as is the growing body of rigorous, empirical research
generated by government economists, academics and other
experts. However, one critical tool remains absent-federal
rulemaking to set baseline standards for the entire student loan
servicing industry.
The Bureau was created to give the federal government a
new toolbox to address emerging risks to consumers and head off
the next crisis in the consumer finance marketplace. As this paper
demonstrates, forty-five million American student loan borrowers
depend on the CFPB to follow through with its mission by taking
decisive action to set strong, enforceable new rules.

